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Immunization Injuries
I. INTRODUCTION
It is generally accepted that immunization is one of society's most valu-
able weapons for combatting communicable diseases. Health authorities ex-
hort the public to participate in immunization programmes. Nearly all the
American states have legislation making immunization a mandatory condition
for school entry.' Compulsory vaccination is seen as an extreme emergency
measure in Canada,2 but there is little doubt that Canadian public health
planners, administrators and practitioners are firmly committed to mass
immunization.3
It must be recognized that vaccination is far from a panacea for the
control of contagious disease. Dr. Frank White, a respected Canadian epi-
demiologist, cautions:
The potential hazards of immunization are numerous and include a variety of pos-
sibilities: simple reactions (such as local pain or swelling at the site of injection),
problems associated with faulty production (such as abnormal toxicity or injec-
tivity, and microbial contamination), faulty administration (such as the use of non-
sterile apparatus, or contamination by the vaccination), individual susceptibility
(such as various allergic manifestations, from local allergy to anaphylactic shock),
damage to the foetus (such as may occur with smallpox vaccination), and the pro-
vocation of disease.
4
Mass immunization programmes have contributed enormously to the
suppression and virtual eradication of some once dreaded diseases. Poliomye-
litis paralyzed 10,000 Canadians in the 1950's. Polio vaccination was im-
plemented in this country in 1955, and has been a staple element of gov-
ernment supported immunization programmes ever since. In the 1970's there
were less than fifty known cases of polio in Canada.5 These great gains
against poliomyelitis over the past three decades have been attributed largely
to vaccination."
Until recently, the magnitude of the benefits of the use of vaccines to
fight polio and other major communicable diseases made consideration of the
1 E.g., Health and Safety Code, 39 West's Cal. Code Ann., §3381 (1977):
The governing authority shall not unconditionally admit any person as a pupil of
any private or public elementary or secondary school, child care center, day nur-
sery, nursery school, or development center, unless prior to his or her first admis-
sion to the institution he or she has been fully immunized against diphtheria, per-
tussis (whooping cough), tetanus, poliomyelitis, and measles in the manner and
with immunizing agents approved by the state department.
Public Health Law, 44 McKinney's Consol. Laws N.Y. Ann., §2164 (1966):
No principal, teacher, owner or person in charge of a school shall permit any child
to be admitted to such school without the certificate provided for in subdivision 5
... or some other acceptable evidence of the child's immunization against polio-
myelitis, mumps, measles, diptheria and rubella.
2 See Public Health Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. P-210, s. 18(d).
3 White, Immunization and Other Measures in Control of Communicable Diseases:
Some Ethical Considerations (Ottawa: Second National Conference on Health and the
Law, 1979) at 4.
4Id.
5 Id. at 5.
6 Oral polio sabin vaccine, in common use since 1961, has been associated with
paralysis, at a risk level estimated to be in the order of 1 in 5 million doses. Id. at 4.
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risks and costs implicit in vaccination almost irrelevant. The dangers and
costs associated with large scale use of vaccines, however, gain prominence
as the likelihood of outbreak of the diseases being combatted declines.
It is important to understand that all vaccines, including those properly
manufactured and administered, are capable of producing adverse reactions.
In a recent study of vaccine-related injuries, the U.S. Office of Technology
Assessment states that while most adverse reactions are mild and self-limiting,
[A] few vaccinees do experience severe adverse reactions that result in permanent
disability or death. While such reactions are rare, many are unavoidable, i.e. they
are caused, not by a defective vaccine product or negligence on the part of tho
vaccinator, but by the inherent properties of a particular vaccine. 7
The central thesis of this article is that the law governing the compensa-
tion of victims of immunization injury in both Canada and the United States
fails to recognize the fundamentally public nature of the immunization pro-
cess. In the context of massive public commitment to immunization as a tool
for controlling communicable disease-evidenced inter alia by government
administered mass immunization programmes and widespread vaccination of
children through the school systems-it is fallacious to regard the vaccinee's
decision to submit to immunization as a purely private matter.
The premise that immunization is a matter of private decision and re-
sponsibility has led to reliance on the judicial process as the mechanism for
the compensation of immunization injury victims. This article seeks to demon-
strate the serious and undesirable ramifications of that reliance for both in-
jured vaccinees and public health policy.
Much of the discussion that follows is devoted to revealing the perverse
complexity and uncertainty of the body of law faced by the injured vaccinnee
considering pursuit of compensation through the courts. Canadian legislation
and jurisprudence is canvassed. The severe limitations and inadequacies of
the fault allocation oriented judicial process as a compensation vehicle are
discussed. Recent, extremely important developments in the United States are
surveyed and analyzed. The contradiction and tension between private law
and public health policy is examined and linked with the critical misconcep-
tion of immunization as a private matter.
Finally, a plea is entered for prompt, serious consideration of alterna-
tives to the current Canadian law, and to the law looming south of the
border.
II. THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
In sharp contrast to the experience of the United States, Canada has
relatively little jurisprudence or academic writing on the issue of immuniza-
tion injury. Several factors could explain this phenomenon.
7 Office of Technology Assessment, "A Review: Legal Liability and Compensation
for Vaccine-Related Injuries," in A Review of Selected Federal Vaccine and ln1nuniza-
tion Policies (Washington: U.S. Congress, 1979) at 83 [hereinafter O.T.A.]. See also:
Wilson, The Hazards of Immunization, Keith Clark Lectures, (London: U. of London,
1966).
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First, since Canada's population is about one-tenth that of the United
States, it is most likely that far fewer incidents of serious8 adverse reaction to
immunization have occurred in this country. Second, examination of immuniza-
tion related legislation suggests that to date Parliament and the legislatures have
left unaddressed the problems of the responsibility for compensation of vic-
tims of immunization injury. Third, it is very likely that victims have been
deterred from seeking compensation through litigation because of the highly
uncertain prospect of recovery under the current law, and by the structural
disincentives posed by our fault-oriented civil litigation process.
A. Incidence of Immunization-Related Injury in Canada
Solid statistics to quantify the incidence of serious adverse reactions to
vaccinations in Canada are unavailable. The federal Bureau of Biologics
collects reports of adverse reactions to vaccination, 9 but the information ob-
tained is of limited value. The sources of reports of suspected adverse reac-
tions vary widely in their reliability. The Bureau is more interested in general
patterns and trends than in the veracity of a particular report and, according-
ly, encourages all interested parties, regardless of their professional training
or interest, to submit reports.
Some interested parties might be tempted to construe the unavailability
of conclusive statistics as indicating the absence or unimportance of the im-
munization injury problem in Canada. Such a construction would be un-
justified. Epidemiologists in a number of provinces report cases involving
communicable diseases that almost certainly were induced by vaccination.' 0
Law suits alleging serious injury and damage as a result of swine flu vaccina-
tion are outstanding."
In any event, to focus too narrowly on the difficulties of quantifying the
immunization injury problem is to miss the real issue. Even advocates of
major, structural reforms in the compensation of injured vaccinees freely
concede that serious adverse reactions to immunization occur rarely12 For
the injured parties, their families and friends, the cost of adverse reactions
such as vaccine induced paralytic polio is extremely high.
It is not suggested that large numbers of people are harshly, inequitably
8 Minor inflammation, swelling and fever commonly accompany vaccination. The
concern, of course, is with an adverse reaction of a far more serious and uncommon
nature that results in serious injury.
9 Interview with Dr. D.C. Pope, Assistant Director, Bureau of Biologics, Drugs
Directorate, Health Protection Branch, Health and Welfare Canada (February 22,
1980). Interview with Dr. Richard Mathias, former Director of the Division of Com-
municable Disease Control, Saskatchewan Health (February 22, 1980).
1o Interview with Dr. Frank White, former Director of Epidemiology and Com-
municable Disease Control, Alberta Social Services and Community Health (March 10,
1980).
11 Interview with Anne H. Russell, Legislative Planner, Alberta Social Services
and Community Health (March 10, 1980).
1
2 Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Liability Arising Out of Immunization
Programs: Final Report to Congress (Washington: D.H.E.W., 1978) at 14 [hereinafter
D.H.E.W.].
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treated by the current approach to compensation. Surely the argument for
reform should not rest on such statistics. The Ontario Law Reform Commis-
sion makes this point in advocating the reform of the law of products liability:
The case for reform of the law of products liability does not rest on the assertion
that there is a large number of cases in which persons injured by defective products
wrongly go uncompensated. ... the case for reform is, rather, that the present law
contains serious anomalies. If anomalies and irrationalities in the structure of the
law cause injustice in even a comparatively small number of cases, there is an
argument for reforming the law and putting it on a more rational basis.13
B. Review of Legislation
1. Federal
While formal jurisdiction to legislate regarding matters of health is clear-
ly held by the provinces under Section 92(7) of the British North America
Act, 1867,14 the manufacture, packaging and sale of vaccines in Canada is
governed federally by The Food and Drugs Act.15
The focus of The Food and Drugs Act is the protection of the public
from the unsafe manufacture and misleading merchandising of food and
drugs. Section 25(1) makes this orientation clear. The Governor in Council
may make regulations regarding inter alia:
b) ... preventing the consumer or purchaser (of food, drugs, cosmetics and
devices) from being deceived or misled as to its quantity, character, value,
composition, merit or safety or to prevent injury to the health of the consumer
or purchaser;
e) respecting the method of preparation, manufacture, preserving, packing, storing
and testing of any food, drug, cosmetic or service in the interest of, or for the
prevention of injury to the health of the consumer or purchaser;
m) adding anything to any of the schedules, in the interest of, or for the pre-
vention of injury to, the health of the consumer or purchaser, or deleting any-
thing therefrom;
The Food and Drug Regulations' discharge the mandate laid down in
section 25(1) by setting out manufacturing specifications, licensing require-
ments and terms and conditions for testing.
The federal authorities closely monitor vaccine use, and maintain a
computerized information system for the collection and analysis of data in-
dicating potential adverse reactions to vaccinations. As was noted above, the
information is not amenable to overly close analysis. Officials look for dis-
13 Ont. L. Ref. Comm'n., Report on Products Liability (Toronto: Min. A.G., 1979)
at 33 [hereinafter Products Liability].
14 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
15 R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27 derives its constitutional validity from the federal criminal
law power provided by s. 91(27) of the British North America Act, 1867, id. See Hogg,
Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1977) at 280-81.
16 8 C.R.C. 1978, c. 870, Part C, Div. 4.
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proportionate levels of incidence of immunization injury by comparing such
things as geographic regions, vaccine lots,17 and time periods.' 8
The reliance by the federal authorities on this information system and
the specifications in the Food and Drug Regulations "for the prevention of
injury to the health of the purchaser or consumer"' 9 rests on the following
premise: that serious adverse reaction to vaccination is caused by vaccine
defect. To be fair, it must be stressed that officials are well aware of and are
troubled by the fact that this approach fails to address the "inherent risk
problem." With good reason, they consider themselves without mandate or
resources to go further.
The Food and Drugs Act is directed at controlling the defective manu-
facture and misleading merchandising of food and drugs. Its focus is regula-
tory; the issue of compensation of persons injured through the use of vac-
cines or other drugs is completely ignored.
2. Provincial
While the provinces have communicable disease control provisions in
their public health legislation and regulation, the compensation issue is un-
addressed. Examination of the public health legislation of a number of prov-
inces indicates that the general preoccupation is with the control of outbreaks
of communicable diseases.
Ontario's main communicable disease provisions are in The Public
Health Act.20 Any number of outbreak-related matters are provided for:
precautions against the spread of infection, 21 isolation of confirmed and sus-
pected carriers,2 entering and disinfecting public conveyances, 23 removal of
persons from unsanitary dwellings,24 and reporting requirements 5 There is
only one compensation provision and it deals with the outbreak context:
Upon evidence satisfactory to the Minister that a person is such a carrier and that
he has been deprived of his means of livelihood by an order or direction of the
medical officer of health, the Department may, out of any monies appropriated by
the Legislature for the purposes of the Department, pay compensation to such
person, the amount of which to be determined in the regulations.2 6
The Public Health Acts of Manitoba,27 Saskatchewan, 28 Alberta 9 and
17 Vaccines are manufactured and labelled in discrete batches termed "lots."
18 Interview with Dr. Napke, Bureau of Epidemiology, Health Protection Branch,
Health and Welfare Canada (February 22, 1980).
19 The Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27, s. 25(1) (e).
2 0 R.S.O. 1970, c. 377, ss. 60-84.
211d., s. 65(1).
22 Id., s. 68.
23 Id., s. 75.
24 Id.
25 Id., s. 64(1).
26 Id., s. 70(4).
27 The Public Health Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. P-210.
28 The Public Health Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. P-37.
2 The Public Health Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 294.
1980]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
British Columbia30 contain similar communicable disease provisions. Each
Act deals with a good number of outbreak-related matters but leaves the
problem of compensating victims of immunization related injury unaddressed.
C. Review of Canadian Jurisprudence
This review is not intended to be a formal examination of the various
strands of common law doctrine that might be shown to touch on the im-
munization injury problem. The purpose is to substantiate the claim made
earlier that in Canada the judicial process has demonstrated itself to be ill-
suited as a vehicle for dispensing immunization injury compensation.
Reported Canadian cases involving immunization questions are com-
pletely unhelpful. The facts and points of law raised in these cases fairly
reflect the legislative perspective. The focus of the litigation has been on the
rights and duties of parties in the context of imminent, suspected or actual
outbreak of communicable diseases.31 It seems that there are no reported
Canadian court decisions dealing directly with the issue of immunization re-
lated injury.
It would seem that a victim of immunization injury seeking to impose
liability on someone for the damages he has suffered must proceed somewhat
obliquely. Two broad legal avenues are open to the potential plaintiff: (a) the
absence of informed consent, and (b) products liability. These are not the
only approaches to the problem, 32 but even this breakdown should more than
adequately demonstrate the confusion and uncertainty marking the injured
vaccinee's legal position.
1. Informed Consent
Two legal truisms are that: (a) generally a patient must consent to
medical treatment, and (b) the patient's consent must be informed. These
truisms, like so many others, lose a good deal of their simplicity in their
application to facts.
According to Professor Picard, the term "informed consent" emerged in
the United States in the 19601S. 33 Picard and others34 agree that much confu-
30 The Health Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 170.
31 See, e.g., Mills v. City of Vancouver (1908), 10 B.C.R. 99 (B.C.S.C.). The Court
held that the good faith retention by the City of Vancouver of a party believed to be a
carrier of smallpox but in fact infected with measles was sustainable by regulations
under The Public Health Act. See also R. v. Ritchie (1902), 35 N.B.R. 581 (C.A.);
Yarwood v. Smith's Falls Bd. of Educ. (1922), 23 O.W.N. 38.
3 2 Rozovsky, Immunization and Its Legal Problems (Ottawa: Second Conference
on Health and the Law, 1979). Rozovsky, Report of the National Immunization Policy
Committee (unpublished paper prepared pursuant to a contract with the National Im-
munization Policy Committee) [hereinafter Report]. Rozovsky breaks down the legal
issues regarding immunization injury into: (a) negligence, (b) products liability and
(c) consent.
33 See Picard, "The Tempest of Informed Consent," in Klar, ed., Studies in Canadian
Tort Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1977) 129 at 130.
34 E.g., Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent" (1968), 36 Fordham L. Rev.
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sion has resulted. "Courts have vacillated on the proper basis for a suit where
the consent was not informed, on the scope of information the doctor must
provide, and on the materiality of the information to the plaintiff." 35
While the term "informed consent" may not have been coined until the
1960's, the underlying concept has long been part of Canadian law.36 For
many years courts in this country have regarded inadequate consent to medi-
cal treatment as grounding liability in two distinct lines of cases: (a) in
battery,37 and (b) in negligence.38 The two actions are very different in law.
Battery involves the intentional application of force on the body of another
without consent.39 Intention plays no part in the law of negligence. The essence
of negligence has been described as "certain conduct that falls below the stand-
ard required by society."40 Rozovsky points out a number of significant dis-
tinctions between suits in battery and in negligence; including differences in
limitation periods, matters of proof, insurance implications and admissibility
of evidence.41 Taking the admissibility question as an example, "if an action
is categorized as assault and battery, medical treatment testimony may not be
permitted to illustrate acceptable medical practice since the standard with
which the procedure was performed becomes irrelevant."4
2
A strong judicial warning regarding the implications of a plaintiff's deci-
sion to plead in battery rather than negligence is presented by Morden J. in
Kelly v. Hazlett:
How the case is pleaded in many cases is more than a matter of mere academic
interest. It will have important bearing on such matters as the incidence of the
onus of proof, causation, and the importance of expert medical evidence, the
significance of medical judgment, proof of damage and, most important, of course,
the substantive basis upon which liability may be found.
43
Kelly v. Hazlett, a much discussed and maligned decision of the Ontario High
Court, is an attempt to clear up the confusion as to the proper meaning of
informed consent in battery and in negligence. Morden J. attempts to tie
together the battery and negligence approaches to informed consent. His view
is that while informed consent is relevant in both battery and negligence, in
35 Picard, supra note 33.
3OSee Marshall v. Curry, [1933] 3 D.L.R. 260, 60 C.C.C. 136 (N.S.S.C.); and
Mulloy v. Hop Sang, [1935] 1 W.W.R. 741 (Alta. C.A.).
37 See, e.g., Marshall, id.; Murray v. McMurchy, [1949] 2 D.L.R. 442, [1949] 1
W.W.R. 989 (B.C.S.C.); Turner v. Toronto Gen. Hosp. Trustees, [1934] O.W.N. 629
(Ont. H.C.); and Halushka v. Univ. of Sask. (1965), 53 D.L.R. (2d) 436, 52 W.W.R.
608 (Sask. C.A.).
38 See, e.g., Kenny v. Lockwood, [1932] O.R. 141, [1932] 1 D.L.R. 507 (Ont. C.A.);
Male v. Hopmans, [1966] 1 O.R. 647, 54 D.L.R. (2d) 592 (Ont. H.C.), varied on
other grounds, [1967] 2 O.R. 457 (Ont. C.A.).
39 Fleming, The Law of Torts (5th ed. Sydney: The Law Book Co., 1977) at 23.
4 0 Linden, Canadian Negligence Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1972) at 4.
41 Rozovsky, Consent to Treatment (1973), 11 Osgoode Hall L.J. 103 at 105-106.
42 Id. at 106.
43 (1976), 15 O.R. (2d) 290 at 311, 75 D.L.R. (3d) 536 at 556, 1 C.C.L.T. 1 at 25
(Ont. H.C.).
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the latter instance the breadth of information required is greater. The learned
judge writes:
If the basic nature and character of the operation performed is substantially that
of which the plaintiff was advised, and then agreed to, then there has not been an
unconsented to invasion of the person of the plaintiff, regardless of any failure to
disclose any collateral risks flowing from the operation. However, such failure, if
it can be shown to have resulted in damage to the patient, and was not justified by
reasonable medical considerations, may properly be subject-matter for a claim
based on negligence.44
Recognizing that it may be difficult to determine whether a given fact in the
context of a specific case goes to the "basic nature and character of the opera-
tion or the procedure to be performed" or is merely collateral, Morden J.
provides this "helpful" guidance:
The more probable the risk the more it could be said to be an integral feature of
the nature and character of the operation. Further, even if a risk is truly collateral,
but still material, it could be said that its disclosure is so essential to an informed
decision to undergo the operation that lack of such disclosure should vitiate the
consent.45
Professor Picard wryly observes that:
If "A" is a certain and serious part of the procedure it goes to the basic nature and
character of the operation. But even if "A" is decided to be collateral it may go
to the "nature and character" if it is material. The determination of the place of
facts like "A" will give the medical and legal professions pause.46
Assessing the "materiality" of information requires a standard for meas-
uring the patient's comprehension. The completeness of communication and
comprehension is extremely important in the negligence context, since the
plaintiff's proof of causation will turn on his establishing that had he been
adequately informed he would not have consented to the operation or treat-
ment which led to the injury.4
7
The two obvious standards of comprehension are: (a) that of the par-
ticular patient-a subjective standard, and (b) that of an ordinary, reason-
able, "Clapham omnibus" patient-an objective standard. It seems clear that
the interests of the medical and health services professions would be best
served by the objective standard, and conversely, that a patient would be best
served by the subjective standard. After reviewing the Canadian cases, Picard
concludes that our courts generally apply the subjective standard.48
This discussion of standards would be incomplete without a brief con-
sideration of the duty of disclosure. A good summary of the two standards,
professional and full, is provided by Seidelson:
Two basically different views emerge from the existing opinions: (1) the extent of
disclosure required will be determined by the application of a professional stan-
dard, or (2) all material risks incident to the proposed treatment must be revealed.
44 Id. at 313 (O.R.), 558 (D.L.R.), 27 (C.C.L.T.).
45 1d. at 313 (O.R.), 559 (D.L.R.), 27 (C.C.L.T.).
46 Picard, supra note 33, at 137.
47 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F. 2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
48 Picard, supra note 33, at 142.
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The first view, currently the prevailing one, is predicated upon a judicial conclusion
that the degree of revelation in each case is a matter to be determined by a medi-
cal judgment, taking into account not only the risks incident to the proposed pro-
cedure but, as well, the adverse effects on the patient's physical or emotional well-
being which might result from a full disclosure. The second view, presently the
minority conclusion, but apparently attracting new adherence, is based on judicial
recognition of the patient's right of self-determination in regard to what is to be
done with or to his body.
4 9
Seidelson's discussion is in reference to American law and practices, but it is
applicable to Canada as well.50
Thus, two standards must be considered: (a) the completeness of the
patient's comprehension, measured on a subjective standard, and (b) the
adequacy of disclosure, measured on an objective, professional standard.
Before leaving this discussion of the Canadian law of informed consent,
two recently reported decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada must be
addressed.
In Hopp v. Lepp,5a the Supreme Court was forced to determine the
liability of an orthopaedic surgeon for damages in negligence and battery in
connection with a spinal disc operation. The Court regarded the main issue
as whether there had been informed consent; that is, whether there had been
sufficient disclosure of the attendant risks by the surgeon.
In summarizing the duty of disclosure under Canadian law, Laskin C.J.C.
said:
[I]n obtaining the consent of a patient for the performance upon him of a surgical
operation, a surgeon, generally, should answer any specific questions posed by the
patient as to the risks involved and should, without being questioned, disclose to
him the nature of the proposed operation, its gravity, any material risks and any
special or unusual risks attendant upon the performance of the operation. ... [tihe
scope of the duty of disclosure and whether or not it has been breached are matters
that must be decided in relation to the circumstances of each particular case.
52
From this it would appear that no general rule spelling out the extent and
nature of the risk information to be conveyed to a potential vaccinee can be
laid down.ca
Reibl v. Hughes5 4 is an important case. Its movement through the courts
has been widely discussed and criticized. A brief review of the decisions may
illustrate the confusion and uncertainty of this area of law.
49 Seidelson, Medical Malpractice: Informed Consent Cases in "Full Disclosure"
Jurisdictions (1976), 14 Duquesne L. Rev. 309 at 309-12.
50 See Male, supra note 38 at 652 (O.R.), 597 (D.L.R.) for the adoption into
Canadian law of the classic statement of the professional standard of disclosure, laid
down by Woodhouse I. in Smith v. Auckland Hosp. Bd., [1964] N.Z.L.R. 241, rev'd [1965]
N.Z.L.R. 191 (C.A.).
51 (1980), 32 N.R. 145 (S.C.C.).
52 Id. at 161.
53 Report, supra note 32, at 17.
54 (1980), 33 N.R. 361 (S.C.C.), rev'd (1977), 16 O.R. (2d) 306 (H.C.), rev'd
(1978), 21 O.R. (2d) 14 (C.A.).
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The initial action was brought in the Ontario High Court of Justice, with
Haines J. presiding.55 The plaintiff suffered from very severe headaches.
Examination by the defendant neurosurgeon revealed a significant narrowing
of the left carotid artery, caused by a build-up of plaque. Although the
arterial constriction was unrelated to the headaches, the defendant surgeon
recommended that the condition be remedied surgically. The defendant warned
of the risk of stroke and even death if the condition were left uncorrected,
but did not warn the patient of the fourteen per cent risk of paralysis or death
as a result of the surgery. 56 The plaintiff agreed to the operation, and either
during or immediately after the operation, the plaintiff suffered a massive
stroke which paralyzed the right side of his body.
The resultant action was pleaded in both battery and negligence. Kelly
v. Hazlett57 had been decided only six months before, and could hardly be
ignored. Haines J., the trial judge in Reibl v. Hughesr8 was uncomfortable
with Morden J.'s use of probability as his criterion for determining whether
a risk is an "integral feature of the nature and character of the operation."
Haines J. suggested that it is not only the probability of a particular risk but
the severity of its realized consequences which controls its characterization
as an "integral feature of the nature and character of the operation."' 9
The learned judge found that the plaintiff's consent to the operation had
been inadequate:
a patient who is asked to consent to an operation which carries with it the hazard
that one in seven patients suffers neurological damage to the central nervous system
causing death or permanent disability, has not been apprised of a central and
fundamental feature of the proposed procedure unless these risks are plainly and
unambiguously brought home to him.... a description of the procedure without
clear reference to those risks is misleading as to the nature and quality of the
procedure; a consent given in ignorance of that central and salient property of the
surgery is no consent at all. 00
Haines J. went on to find the defendant liable both in battery and negligence,
characterizing the operation-related risk of paralysis and death as going to the
basic character and nature of the procedure in the battery context, and as
collateral in the negligence context.'
With her fine analysis of Canadian informed consent law virtually com-
pleted when Reibl v. Hughes,02 was handed down, Professor Picard took
comfort from Haines J.'s refusal to follow Kelly v. Hazlett: 63
ReibI v. Hughes may forecast the future. The subjective patient test and the profes-
55 (1977), 16 O.R. (2d) 306, 78 D.L.R. (3d) 35 (Ont. H.C.).
56 Sharpe, Recent Canadian Court Decisions on Consent (1977), 117 C.M.A.J. 1421
at 1423.
57 Supra note 43.
'58 Supra note 55.
59 Supra note 55 at 312 (O.R.), 42 (D.L.R.).
6O Id.
61 See Picard, supra note 33, at 144.
62 Supra note 55.
63 Supra note 43.
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sional disclosure standard will stand. The courts may grapple with the theoretical
difficulties of characterizing risks as basics or collateral but will not be barred from
allowing recovery to the patient who has not given an informed consent.64
Less than a year after those words were published, the decision of Haines
J. in Reibl v. Hughes was reversed by the Ontario Court of Appeal.65 Speak-
ing for the Court, Brooke J.A. seemed to adopt a professional medical stand-
ard for determining the adequacy of the explanation of risk: "The manner in
which the nature and degree of risk is explained to a particular patient is
better left to the judgment of the doctor in dealing with the man before
him." 6
Brooke J.A. objected that Haines J. had "resorted to a description of
the risk that no doctor has used or would use as he did and in so doing has
ignored the evidence that he accepted. '0 7
More significantly, Brooke J.A. rejected the subjective standard for de-
termining the causation question. Citing several American authorities,68 he
urged that Canadian courts take heed of the reliance by American courts on
an objective standard.6 9 Brooke J.A. stopped just short of adopting a wholly
objective standard when he said: "I think a safe practice here is to test the
plaintiff's case objectively before proceeding to consider it subjectively." 7
After ordering a new trial on the negligence issue Brooke J.A. turned
to the question of battery. It was noted above that the prevailing Canadian
view has been that inadequate consent to treatment may give rise to suits in
both battery and negligence. Commentators regarded the judgment of the
trial court in Reibl v. Hughes71 as consistent with that view. 72 Evidently,
Brooke J.A. reads the Canadian cases very differently. He cited Cobbs v.
Grant73 and Prosser 74 as authority for the proposition that
in some of the State Courts of the United States of America where the doctrine of
informed consent is applied, the prevailing view is that cases for failure to disclose
risks inherent in recommended surgery which may cause a plaintiff's loss or
damages should be pleaded in negligence rather than in battery.75
He went on to say:
save for the judgment at trial here, Canadian cases have in fact conformed with
6
4 Picard, supra note 33, at 144.
05 (1978), 21 O.R. (2d) 14, 89 D.L.R. (3d) 112, 6 C.C.L.T. 227 (Ont. C.A.).
6 Id. at 23 (O.R.), 122 (D.L.R.), 239 (C.C.L.T.).
67 Id. at 27 (O.R.), 125 (D.L.R.), 244 (C.C.L.T.).
66 Barnette v. Potenza, 359 N.Y. Supp. 2d 432, 79 Misc. 2d 51 (Sup. Ct. 1974);
Canterbury, supra note 47; and Cobbs v. Grant, 8 C. 3d 229, 502 P. 2d 1 (S.C. 1972).
69 Reibl, supra note 65, at 27 (O.R.), 125 (D.L.R.), 244 (C.C.L.T.).
70 Id. at 27 (O.R.), 125 (D.L.R.), 243 (C.C.L.T.).
71 Reibl, supra note 55.
72 Picard, supra note 33, at 144.
73 Supra note 68.
74 Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. St. Paul: West, 1971).
75 Reibl, supra note 65, at 28 (O.R.), 126 (D.L.R.), 244 (C.C.L.T.).
19801
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
the view expressed by Professor Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th ed. (1971), and in
Cobbs v. Grant, supra .... I agree with that view. In cases such as this, the notion
of battery seems quite inappropriate. 7
6
In a unanimous decision handed down on October 7, 1980, the Supreme
Court of Canada reversed the Ontario Court of Appeal and restored the
judgment of Haines J. at trial.
Laskin C.J.C. considered that the Court of Appeal went too far in adopt-
ing what amounted to a professional standard when judging the adequacy of'
an explanation to a particular patient regarding the degree and nature of the'
risk attendant upon the particular medical treatment. In the Chief Justice's
words:
What a doctor knows or should know that the particular patient deems relevant to
a decision whether to undergo prescribed treatment goes equally to his duty of
disclosure as do the material risks recognized as a matter of required medical
knowledge.... the materiality of non-disclosure of certain risks to an informed
decision is a matter for the trier of fact, a matter on which there would, in all like-
lihood, be medical evidence but also other evidence, including evidence from the
patient or from members of his family.
77
On the question of causation, Laskin C.J.C. refused to be swayed by
earlier decisions of lower Canadian courts apparently applying a subjective
test, and viewed the matter as res integra in the Supreme Court. The Chief
Justice went on to reject the combined "objective-subjective" test apparently
employed by Brooke J. in the Ontario Court of Appeal:
[It is] the safer course on the issue of causation to consider objectively how far the
balance in the risks of surgery or no surgery is in favour of undergoing surgery ...
[T]he objective standard is the preferable one on the issue of causation ...
[A]Ithough account must be taken of a patient's particular position, a position
which will vary with the patient, it must be objectively assessed in terms of
reasonableness.
78
In dealing with the battery ground, Laskin C.J.C. agreed with Brooke
J.A.'s view that battery is an inappropriate ground for a suit alleging inade-
quate disclosure attendant to medical treatment or surgery otherwise con-
sented to.79 In Laskin C.J.C.'s view, suits in battery should be available only
in those surgical or other medical treatment cases:
Where surgery or treatment has been performed or given to which there has been
no consent at all or where, emergency situations aside, surgery or treatment has
been performed or given beyond that to which there was consent.... [uinless
there has been misrepresentation or fraud to secure consent to the treatment, a
failure to disclose the attendant risks, however serious, should go to negligence
rather than to battery. Although such a failure relates to an informed choice of
submitting to or refusing recommended and appropriate treatment, it arises as the
breach of an anterior duty of due care, comparable in legal obligation to the duty
of due care in carrying out the particular treatment to which the patient has con-
sented. It is not a test of the validity of the consent.80
761d.
77 Supra note 54, at 373-74.
78 id. at 377-79.
79 Id. at 368-69.
80 Id. at 370-71.
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In reversing the Court of Appeal and restoring the judgment at trial, the
Chief Justice concluded that since the plaintiff was under the mistaken im-
pression (as a result of the defendant's breach of his duty of disclosure) that
the surgery would relieve his continuing headaches, a reasonable person in
the plaintiff's position would, on the balance of probabilities, have rejected
the surgery. 8'
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Reibl v. Hughes has
two principal effects: firstly, to narrow the availability of battery to surgery
or treatment cases where treatment is either completely unconsented to, or
"given beyond that to which there was consent,"8 2 and secondly, to strike a
delicate balance on the standards by which (a) the materiality of non-
disclosure of certain risks to an informed decision, and (b) causality are to
be judged. A professional, medical standard for assessing the materiality of
non-disclosure is insufficient; "what the doctor knows or should know that
the particular patient deems relevant to a decision whether to undergo pre-
scribed treatment goes equally to his duty of disclosure as do the material
risks recognized as a matter of required medical knowledge."8' Assessment
of the materiality of non-disclosure is a matter for the trial judge.
The issue of causality (the degree to which a patient's decision is deter-
mined by non-disclosure) is to be dealt with by considering "objectively how
far the balance in the risks of surgery or no surgery is in favour of under-
going surgery." 84 Laskin C.J.C. takes pains to note that although his objective
test does not and should not preclude consideration of a "patient's particular
position, a position which will vary with the patient, it must be objectively
assessed in terms of reasonableness."
85
Although Laskin C.J.C.'s judgment imposes a formidable duty of dis-
closure on the provider of medical service or treatment, and probably pro-
duces a fair result in the instant case, the decision provides little predictive
value to a potential plaintiff. Application of the ReibI v. Hughes standards
of materiality and causality must be accompanied by the careful assessment
and delicate weighing of the facts of particular cases.
The point of this discussion of informed consent has been simply to
demonstrate the uncertainty pervading this area of law. A number of impor-
tant and difficult questions, such as the capacity of the mentally handicapped
and minors, have been deliberately excluded, with the view and hope that
the point has already been made.
2. Products liability
Products liability is too broad and complex an area of law to be more
than highlighted here. Warranty and negligence, the two general grounds
81 Id. at 408-10.
82 Id. at 370.
83 Id. at 373.
841 d. at 377.
85 1d. at 379.
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upon which a manufacturer may be held responsible for harm caused by his
product, both require proof of defect.8 6
The Sale of Goods Act of Ontario codifies the implied warranties of
(a) reasonable fitness for particular purpose, and (b) merchantable quality.
87
The provision has been generally taken to impose what is, in effect, strict
liability on a business seller for the supply of defective goods.8 8 Section 15
and the implied warranties it represents, however, are severely and strictly
circumscribed by the old rule of privity of contract: "[t]he section applies
only when there is a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant for the
sale of goods."89 Such a contract virtually never exists between the manufac-
turer and ultimate recipient of vaccine. Consequently, the implied warranties
provide little assistance to the injured vaccinee.90
The law of negligence is far more flexible. Canadian courts have demon-
strated their willingness to incorporate aspects of the doctrine of strict liability
into negligence, while stopping short of open acceptance and application of
strict liability.91 The malleability of negligence law, and the tremendous pres-
sures created by a series of American cases discussed later in this paper signal
the need to outline at least the basic features of this area of law.
a) Negligence
Writers disagree widely on the purposes and elements of negligence law.
Linden defines negligence as "certain conduct that falls below the standard
required by society.
'92
The foundation of the manufacturer's duty of care to the ultimate con-
sumer of his product is considered to have been laid by Lord Atkin in
Donoghue v. Stevenson.9 3 He stated his privity-shattering principle as follows:
a manufacturer of products which he sells in such a form as to show that he
intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him,
with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with the know-
ledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the
products will result in an injury to the consumer's life or property, owes a duty to
the consumer to take that reasonable care.
9 4
This new strand of negligence doctrine was received with widespread ap-
proval by the common law courts, and applied to a very wide range of
products and defendants.9 5 The plaintiff's burden of proof of causation has
been eased by the courts' readiness to apply the procedural device of res ipsa
8 6 Products Liability, supra note 13, at 13, 23.
87 R.S.O. 1970, c. 421, s. 15.
88 Products Liability, supra note 13, at 22.
89 Id. at 26-27.
00 Rozovsky, supra note 32, at 6.
91 Products Liability, supra note 13, at 18.
92 Linden, supra note 40, at 4.
93 [1932] A.C. 562, [1932] All E.R. Rep. 1, 48 T.L.R. 494 (H.L.).
94 Id. at 599 (A.C.), 20 (All E.R. Rep.), 504 (T.L.R.).
95 Linden, supra note 40, at 398-404.
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loquitur9" where the victims of immunization injury are able to prove that
the vaccine used failed to meet reasonable standards-the standards set out
in the Food and Drug Regulations-courts are likely to find negligence.
97
In the mid-nineteenth century a special negligence category for "inher-
ently dangerous" products was developed as a judicial device to escape the
harsh privity rule.08 Although the need for and use of this device largely dis-
appeared after Donoghue v. Stevenson,"0 a legacy of the "inherently dan-
gerous" products doctrine is that a higher standard of care is demanded of
manufacturers of dangerous products than of producers of "inherently in-
nocuous" products. This higher standard is not a special or independant rule;
it reflects the general negligence principle that "[t]he burden of taking pre-
cautions increases as the probability of harm and the severity of the damage
threatened increase."'' 0
The "reasonableness" element of the manufacturer's duty of care is a
vital limitation of the law of negligence-particularly in the context of im-
munization injury. As Fleming notes:
[i]n determining the requisite standard of safety, negligence does not demand more
than what reasonable care should have assured.... negligence law does not demand
protection against risks which proper care could not have eliminated. Excluded
therefore are defects which are (practically) undiscoverable, like serum hepatitis
in blood plasma; even more, risks which remained unknown despite all proper
precautions, as possibly with new drugs.1o'
Negligence law holds manufacturers subject to a duty to warn users of
their products about dangers either inherent in those products or attendant
on their use.10 2 Warnings must explicitly and clearly describe the dangers
involved. In Lambert v. Lastoplex Chemicals Co.,' 03 the Supreme Court of
Canada stressed the importance of explicitness in warnings. As Laskin J. (as
he then was) said:
Where manufactured products are put on the market for ultimate purchase and use
by the general public and carry danger, ... although put to the use for which they
are intended, the manufacturer, knowing of their hazardous nature, has a duty to
specify the attendant dangers, which it must be taken to appreciate in a detail not
known to the ordinary consumer or user.... The required explicitness of the
warning will, of course, vary with the danger likely to be encountered in the
ordinary use of the product.' 0 4
Rozovsky views the Lambert case as laying down "[t]he most important
duty on a manufacturer" and concludes, without elaboration, that "[t]here is
reason to believe that we will follow the American example and impose
96 Fleming, supra note 39, at 508-509.
9 7 E.g., Sterling Trust Corp. v. Postma, [1965] S.C.R. 324, 48 D.L.R. (2d) 423.
98 Fleming, supra note 39, at 513.
99 Supra note 93.
100 Linden, supra note 40, at 420-21; see Rae v. Eaton (1961), 45 M.P.R. 261 at
276, 28 D.L.R. (2d) 522 at 535 (N.B.S.C. App. Div.).
101 Fleming, supra note 39, at 510.
102 Linden, supra note 40, at 417.
103 [1972] S.C.R. 569, 25 D.L.R. (3d) 121.
104 Id. at 574-75 (S.C.R.), at 125 (D.L.R.).
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greater obligations on everyone who supplies any type of product to warn
them [sic] of the inherent risks apart from any actual defects."' 05 Rozovsky
has also stated that "[t]he courts have also required manufacturers to warn
the consumers of their products of any inherent dangers." 00 He cited a 1955
case involving a glue manufacturer,107 and abruptly concluded "[t]his is of
particular importance with respect to immunization."' 0 He may well be
right, but a deserving injured vaccinee could be forgiven for declining to sue
on the strength of such authority.
The special case of immunization injury occurring as a result of the risk
inherent in the vaccination process, where the vaccine is manufactured in
accordance with prevailing standards, should once again be noted. Since suits
grounded in the law of warranty and negligence by definition require proof
of defect, neither branch of law can assist the unfortunate vaccinee who was
injured by a vaccine meeting the prevailing standards.
b) Strict Liability
The general principle that a manufacturer of a defective product that
causes injury should be strictly liable in damages has been widely accepted
in the United States and elsewhere, 1 9 but has yet to be approved by the
Canadian courts. 11 That the doctrine of strict liability will eventually spill
over into this country is widely predicted and advocated by highly respected
academics and research bodies."' To date, however, strict liability provides
no assistance to the victim of immunization injury in Canada.112
These "highlights" of Canadian law show the complexity and confusion
of the legal position of the injured vaccinee under current Canadian law. Two
critical ingredients contributing to that position are the paucity of Canadian
court decisions dealing directly with the question of compensation of injured
vaccinees, and the fundamentally fluid nature of negligence law. 118 The com-
105 Rozovsky, supra note 32, at 6.
106 Report, supra note 30, at 42.
107 Stewart v. Lepage's Inc., [1955] O.R. 937 (H.C.).
108 Report, supra note 32, at 42.
109 Linden, supra note 40, at 425.
110 Products Liability, supra note 13, at 64.
II1 Id.; Linden, supra note 40, at 425-26; Waddams, Products Liability (Toronto:
Carswell, 1974) at 233.
112 The Saskatchewan and New Brunswick legislatures have enacted consumer pro.
tection legislation that comes very close to strict liability. Both the Saskatchewan Con.
sumer Products Warranties Act, 1977, S.S. 1976-77, c. 15 and New Brunswick's Con-
sumer Product Warranty and Liability Act, 1978, S.N.B. 1978, c. C-18.1, apply only to
"consumer products" which are defined so narrowly as to exclude vaccines. See Products
Liability, supra note 13, at 39-44.
113 Linden, supra note 40, at 1-2. In introducing his text on negligence, Linden
stresses the importance of fluidity in negligence law:
Negligence law is a vibrant and dynamic instrument. It has to be. As soon as
some new type of activity emerges, its conduct is accommodated within the
general framework of negligence principles. Because of this, it has been said that
"the categories of negligence are never closed." This may be merely the instinct
of self-preservation at work, for if negligence law abandoned its fluidity, it would
probably wither away.
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bined effect of these ingredients is to make recent developments in the United
States extremely relevant.
III. THE AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
In a line of cases beginning with Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories
114
in 1960, United States courts have been placing increasing liability on vaccine
manufacturers. Plaintiffs have relied on three grounds for recovery: negli-
gence, breach of implied warranty and strict liability in tort.1 5 Strict liability
has almost completely superseded implied warranty in recent years, as the
courts have moved with the trend toward broader recovery in the products
liability field.116
In Gottsdanker, fifty-four separate claims were launched, alleging that
the method employed to kill the virus in salk polio vaccine used in a mass
immunization programme in the western states was defective. The defendant
did not challenge the causal link between use of the vaccine and the plaintiff's
injuries, but argued that because their manufacturing process satisfied Federal
government standards, no negligence could be found. The California Supreme
Court found for the plaintiffs, ruling that "no negligence need be proved since
the manufacturer was liable for any personal injury caused by his product
since it was 'sold' under a guarantee or warranty of its purity and safety for
human consumption."' 1 T The Court refused to be deterred by the absence of
a contractual relationship between the defendant and the ultimate users of the
vaccine, and held that the defendant was bound by a relationship of responsi-
bility, running directly from the manufacturer to the eventual and foreseeable
user. 11 8
The next case of note, Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories,"9 represents a
major extension of the vaccine manufacturer's liability to the ultimate reci-
pient. Until Davis, it was generally thought that the manufacturer's duty to
warn of inherent risks in vaccination applied only to the party administering
the vaccine, who was in turn responsible for warning the vaccinee. 120 The
Court found Wyeth Laboratories strictly liable in tort for failure to ensure
that the ultimate recipients of their vaccine received adequate warning.
In Davis, a thirty-nine year old man contracted polio after receiving the
defendant's Type III sabin polio vaccine at a mass immunization clinic. Six
months before Davis was vaccinated, the U.S. Surgeon General released a
statement indicating the existence of the risk of contracting polio through use
114 6 Cal. Rptr. 320, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602 (1960).
115 Mann, Mass Immunization Cases: Drug Manufacturers' Liability for Failure to
Warn (1976), 29 Van. L. Rev. 235 at 243.
110 Id.
117 Curran, Influence of the Courts of Law on Biologicals Development: Regulation
and Use (Geneva: Int'l Conference on the Individual and the Community in the
Research, Development and Use of Biologicals, 1976) at 1-2.
118 Id.
119 399 F. 2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
120 D.H.E.W., supra note 12, at 27.
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of the Type III vaccine, and that adults were especially susceptible. While
excerpts from the Surgeon General's report were included in the vaccine
package insert, the defendant's representative did not attempt to warn either
the administering pharmacist or the public of the vaccine's risk. The insert
was not read by the pharmacist, and the plaintiff was not warned. The appel-
late court found it significant that the manufacturer had taken an active part
in organizing the immunization programme, and knew that the warnings con-
tained in the package insert were not reaching the vaccinees. 121 The Court
rejected the defendant's argument that the less than one in a million chance
of serious injury to the vaccinee was "trifling" when compared to the social
benefit of immunization, ruling that: "When in a particular case, the risk
qualitatively (e.g., of death or major disability) as well as quantitatively, on
balance with the end sought to be achieved, is such as to call for a true choice
judgment, medical or personal, the warning must be given.1
122
The holding in Davis was significantly extended by the important and
controversial case of Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories,'23 where an eight month
old child received the defendant's trivalent polio vaccine 124 in a Texas public
health clinic and subsequently contracted poliomyelitis. Wyeth Laboratories
was found strictly liable for the injury, despite the fact that an epidemic was
in progress in the community at the time of the infant's vaccination, and
despite strong medical evidence suggesting that the child's polio was not vac-
cine induced. 125
In deciding the strict liability question, the U.S. Court of Appeal applied
a two-step analysis to determine "first, whether the product is so unsafe that
marketing it at all is 'unreasonably dangerous per se', and, if not, whether
the product has been introduced into the stream of commerce without suffi-
cient safeguards and is thereby 'unreasonably dangerous as marketed'."' 2
For the first step, the Court relied on the "reasonable man" standard for
balancing the utility of the properly used product against the risks inherent in
the product's use. The Court regarded the defendant's vaccine as an "un-
avoidably unsafe product"'27 and recognized that the use of such products
raises at least a small element of danger,128 but found Wyeth Laboratories
justified in marketing the vaccine despite the danger. Stressing the severity of
the disease being combatted, the Court ruled "only if the potential harmful
effects of the product-both qualitative and quantitative-outweigh the legiti-
mate public interest in its availability will it be declared unreasonably dan-
gerous per se and the person placing it on the market held liable.' 29
121 Davis, supra note 119, at 131; D.H.E.W., supra note 12 at 28; Baynes, Liability
to Vaccine Related Injuries: Public Health Considerations, Report under Contract with
Communicable Disease Control (Washington: D.H.E.W., 1975) at 37.
122 Davis, supra note 119, at 129-30.
123 498 F. 2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
124 That vaccine uses a live virus to effect immunity.
125 Baynes, supra note 121, at 35.
126 Reyes, supra note 123, at 1273.
127 This point was uncontested by Wyeth Laboratories.
128 Reyes, supra note 123, at 1274.
129 Id.
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With regard to the second step, the Reyes Court turned to section 402A
and comment K of the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts' 30 requiring
a seller who has reason to believe that danger may result from a particular use of
his product to provide adequate warning of the danger..., failure to give such a
warning when it is required will itself present a "defect" in the product and will,
without more, cause the product to be "unreasonably dangerous as marketed."'131
The Court concluded, upon examination of the particular facts of the
Reyes case that the defendant failed to escape step two:
Wyeth knew or had reason to know that the vaccine would not be administered as
a prescription drug, and therefore was required to warn foreseeable users, or see
that the Texas Department of Health warned them.... Wyeth's failure to warn
was a breach of its duty and made the vaccine "defective"-hence "unreasonably
dangerous"-as marketed.' 3 2
The Court continued:
[I]n the case of a prescription drug which is unavoidably unsafe, and to which
there is a certain, though small, risk throughout the population, there must be
either a warning-meaningful and complete so as to be understood by the recipient
-or an individualized medical judgment that this treatment or medication is
necessary and desirable for this patient." 33
Under the rationale of Davis as applied and extended by Reyes, the de-
termination of a manufacturer's liability for "an unavoidably unsafe drug"
(i.e. a vaccine the danger of which inheres from its very nature, and not from
any deficiency in its manufacture) turns on a two-step analysis. First, it must
be determined whether the utility of the vaccine's availability to the public
is outweighed by the probable public harm. If so, the vaccine will be found
"unreasonably dangerous per se" and the party placing it on the market will
be held liable." 4 Second, where the manufacturer knows or should reason-
baly be expected to know of dangers raised by use of its vaccine, it will be
held liable unless it gives adequate warning of those dangers. Generally a
warning to the physician will suffice. In the mass immunization and public
health clinic contexts, unless there is a physician present at the time of the
vaccination such that an "individualized medical judgment that this treat-
ment or medication is necessary and desirable for this patient"135 can be
made, to avoid liability the manufacturer must ensure the warning reaches
the vaccinee."3
6
The 1977 case of Givens v. Lederle"7 further extended the scope of the
vaccine manufacturer's duty to warn. There, the plaintiff contracted polio
130 Am. L. Inst., Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts (Chicago: Am. L. Inst.,
1965).
131 Reyes, supra note 123, at 1275.
132 Id. at 1277.
133 Id. at 1295.
134 Id. at 1274.
135 Id. at 1295.
136 Baynes, supra note 121, at 38.
'37 556 F. 2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977).
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after her infant daughter was immunized with sabin oral polio vaccine in a
private physician's office.
The manufacturer's defence did not seriously question the extension of
liability to injury suffered by a person in contact with a vaccinee, but focussed
on the nature of the dispensation of the vaccine and the adequacy of the
warning.' 38 Lederle argued that because the vaccination took place in a pri-
vate physician's office, the "individualized medical attention" referred to in
Davis and Reyes had been provided, thereby dissolving the causal link be-
tween the manufacturer and the injury.
The Court was unimpressed. Summarizing and relying on the holding in
Davis, the Givens Court ruled that
when a manufacturer knows or should know that the drug will be used without
prescription, as in a mass innoculation, he has a duty to warn each individual
consumer. ... Dr. LaRue, the private pediatrician, testified that the administration
in his office "really doesn't differ" from that of the Public Health Centre.... [ilf
so, then Lederle is responsible for taking definite steps to get the warning directly
to the consumer.
13 9
The Court went considerably further by holding that even if "individualized
medical attention" had been provided, the warning provided by the manufac-
turer in the form of a package insert was so inadequate that the jury's finding
of liability would have been upheld.140 The manufacturer's package insert
conceded that some vaccinees immunized with live vaccine, and people who
had been in close contact with such vaccinees had contracted polio. The in-
sert also stated, however, that "such occurrences are rare, and it could not
be definitely established that any such case was due to the vaccine strain and
was not coincidental with infection due to naturally occurring poliomyelitis."
The Court considered that the jury was justified in concluding that "the warn-
ing did not sufficiently point out the possibility that the live vaccine could
cause polio.'
41
For the vaccine manufacturer, Givens is a very important case. Reyes
left the manufacturer two escape routes for avoiding liability: (a) a warning
of risk, and (b) "individualized medical judgment" that the particular vac-
cination was necessary and desirable for the particular vaccinee. 142 The
Givens decision effectively seals off the second route.
143
138 D.H.E.W., supra note 12, at 34n. 7.
139 Givens, supra note 137, at 1345.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Reyes, supra note 123, at 1295.
143 O.T.A., supra note 7, at 92. The fact and outcome of this case essentially forced
the manufacturer to assume that the vaccines will be dispensed without "individualized
medical judgment" regardless of the forum and the form of dispensation. A report of the
U.S. Dept. of Health, supra note 12, at 35 provides a succinct statement of the crucial
legal implications of Davis, Reyes and Givens for the vaccine manufacturer:
a manufacturer will have to ensure that a warning is given to vaccine recipients
in all circumstances. After Givens, it cannot even assume that an insert will be
sufficient to exempt it from liability when a physician fails to warn a vaccinee in
a private office. Moreover, the warning given must warn recipients fully of the
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A great number of vaccination injury law suits have reached the Ameri-
can courts in recent years. 44 Davis, Reyes and Givens, all decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals, have been the subject of considerable aca-
demic criticism, but clearly represent the current American law. The Davis,
Reyes and Givens cases have yet to be applied by, or even argued before a
Canadian court. There are indications, however, that Canada's immunity will
not last much longer.145 The extreme flexibility of the law of negligence, the
willingness of Canadian courts to adopt some of the characteristics of strict
liability "in order to allocate losses in ways that seem to them appropriate,
and in order to compensate the victims of accidents,"' 46 and the dearth of
Canadian authority directly on point suggest that these American cases are
likely to have a tremendous impact on the development of Canadian law in
this area.
Accordingly, consideration of some of the policy implications of the
Davis, Reyes and Givens cases is appropriate.
IV. POLICY ASPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
DAVIS, REYES AND GIVENS
A. Imposition of Strict Liability on the Manufacturer
If these cases are viewed in the products liability context, the courts'
application of strict liability comes as no surprise. It is generally accepted in
the United States that compensation of injured persons is better treated
through the law of torts than through the law of contracts. 47 Much of the
impetus for shifting the ground for compensation of personal injury victims
from contractual to tortious liability was provided by the 1960 New Jersey
Supreme Court decision of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc. 4s The
theory of warranty liability laid down in that case was de facto strict liability
in tort.149
qualitative and quantitative risks of a vaccine. Finally, if no warning is in fact
given, or if it is insufficient, a rebuttable presumption will arise that failure to
warn was the proximate cause of a vaccinee's injury.
144 Four hundred and sixty-four lawsuits were filed alleging injuries suffered as a
result of vaccination under the swine flu immunization programme, and as of September
1979, less than 50 claims had been settled. O.T.A., supra note 7, at 100.
145 A recent Statement of Claim filed in the Alberta Court of Appeal alleges that
the plaintiff suffered "injury as a result of receiving a Swine Flu Shot," and that both the
province and the Canadian manufacturer of the vaccine were negligent in "[nlot warning
the public, including the male Plaintiff, that there was a possibility of adverse reactions
to the shot prior to supplying and promoting the serum for use."
One would certainly expect the plaintiff to argue the Davis, Reyes and Givens line
of cases.
See also Rozovsky, supra note 32, at 6.
146 Products Liability, supra note 13, at 18.
147 Id. at 51.
148 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69, 75 A.L.R. 2d 1.
149 Products Liability, supra note 13, at 51.
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Spurred by the efforts of Prosser,150 in 1965 the American Law Institute
enshrined the principle of strict liability in tort in the Restatement (Second)
of the Law of Torts.151 The strict liability principle has been adopted by the
courts of most American jurisdictions. As is noted above, although strict
liability is not yet generally accepted in Canada, the Ontario Law Reform
Commission strongly recommends the adoption of the principle, and also,
two provinces have enacted legislation holding manufacturers and retailers
strictly liable in a narrowly defined "consumer products" context. 152
While this doctrine justifiably enjoys widespread support in the general
products liability context, there is less than universal agreement that the
rationale for strict liability applies equally well in the narrower context of
liability for immunization injury.
Probably the strongest argument generally advanced on behalf of strict
liability is that it is an efficient, effective means of spreading the risk and cost
of compensating accident victims. 15 Proponents of strict liability argue that,
"[tihe drug manufacturer is in the best position to assess the risks of his
products, and better able than any party, save perhaps the government, to
spread the cost of accidents broadly among those who benefit from their
use."154
Those who oppose the imposition of strict liability on vaccine manufac-
turers express strong concern regarding the implications of cases like Davis,
Reyes and Givens. They argue that the spectre of high damage awards and
the enormous practical difficulties of avoiding future liability are driving
manufacturers out of vaccine production.155 Certainly the number of firms
engaged in the manufacture of vaccines in the United States has declined
dramatically over the past 15 years. Ohta notes that, "of the three major
firms producing live polio virus vaccine during the past 15 years, only one
remains; of the six producing live measles virus vaccine, only one remains;
of the eight producing inactivated influenza virus vaccine, only four remain;
and of the four producing live rubella virus vaccine, only one remains."15
The Canadian vaccine manufacturing industry is even more concentrated.
Three manufacturers share the market in Canada: Connaught Laboratories
Limited of Toronto, Institut Armand-Frappier of Montreal and the Ameri-
can firm of Merke, Sharpe and Dome Ltd.
1'57
150 Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer) (1965-66),
50 Minn. L. Rev. 791.
151 Supra note 130, §402A.
152 See, supra notes 111, 112.
153 Products Liability, supra note 13, at 69.
154 Merrill, Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries (1973), 59 Va. L. Rev. I
at 109.
155 Mann, supra note 115, at 235, 251.
156 Ohta, Immunization Injuries: Proposed Compensatory Mechanisms-An Analysis
(1978-79), 11 Conn. L. Rev. 147 at 160.
157 McIntosh, A Study of Vaccine Use in Alberta (unpublished report prepared for
Alberta Social Services and Community Health, 1980).
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It is not suggested that the prospect of the adoption of strict liability is
responsible for this concentration of vaccine supply. Indeed, it is not surpris-
ing that the lion's share of the Canadian vaccine market is controlled by one
manufacturer. The market is not large, and potential suppliers are confronted
by prohibitive barriers to entry. The facilities, technology and expertise re-
quired are extensive and expensive; there is simply not enough demand to
support a large number of manufacturers.
It should also be noted that manufacturers already view vaccine pro-
duction as a marginally profitable venture. The major American vaccine
producers are broadly diversified drug manufacturing houses that produce
vaccines as sidelines to their more profitable operations. Connaught Lab-
oratories Limited researches and manufactures a diverse range of scientific,
medical and biological products. Connaught is not dependant on vaccine
manufacture for survival, and would be able to halt vaccine production
should that operation become financially prohibitive.15 Institut Armand-
Frappier, on the other hand, is a small, financially vulnerable manufacturer
of a limited number of biological products. Its management is extremely
worried about the prospect of the imposition of strict liability.159
While it may be economically rational that Canada's limited vaccine
market be serviced by a small number of manufacturers, such a concentration
only exacerbates the threat to security of vaccine supply created by the
imposition of strict liability.
The serious vaccine supply difficulties that plagued the Swine Flu Im-
munization Program illustrate the danger of imposing strict liability on vac-
cine manufacturers. The Swine Flu Immunization Program, initiated by the
U.S. federal government in the spring of 1976, called for the development,
manufacture and administration of enough swine flu vaccine so that every
American citizen could be innoculated against the influenza.' 60 A cooperative
effort of major manufacturers and public health officials resulted in the suc-
cessful development of the new vaccine, but the entire programme very nearly
foundered on the liability question. Insurance companies were made wary by
the Davis, Reyes and Givens line of cases, and by the enormous liability
potential of such a large scale immunization programme. They refused to
underwrite manufacturers' liability for vaccine-related injuries.'" The manu-
facturers refused to supply the vaccine without protection against liability.
Aided by an unlikely and fortuitous combination of circumstances, 62 Con-
158 Interview with Terrance D. Macaulay, Director of Finance, Connaught Labora-
tories Ltd. (Jan. 11, 1980).
159 Interview with Pierre Diotte, Director, Marketing and Sales, Institut Armand-
Frappier (January 16, 1980).
1G0 Baynes, Liability for Vaccine Related Injuries: Public Health Considerations and
Some Reflections on Swine Flu Experience (1977), 21 St. Louis U. L. J. 44 at 62-63.
161 The insurance companies' reluctance seems to have been justified. By September
1979, 3,694 claims and 464 lawsuits alleging injury caused by the swine flu vaccine had
been filed, seeking nearly $4 billion in damages. To that date, less than 50 claims had
been settled. O.T.A., supra note 7, at 100.
102 Baynes, supra note 160, at 65-66.
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gress was able to circumvent the impasse by passing the National Swine Flu
Immunization Program of 1976.163 The legislation indemnified manufacturers
against all claims alleging personal injury or death as a result of the manu-
facture, distribution or administration of the vaccine. 104 The insurance in-
dustry subsequently restored the vaccine manufacturers' products liability
coverage.
This ad hoc legislation averted a particular crisis, but fell far short of
addressing the underlying issue of the utility of applying the strict liability
doctrine in the vaccine context. Economists are attracted to strict liability
because costs of compensating accident victims are treated as part of overall
product cost. Economists are untroubled by the fact that production of cer-
tain products may thereby become unprofitable and unfeasible. They argue
that "[a] product that can only be produced at the expense of innocent per-
sons injured by its defects perhaps ought not to remain on the market."'u 6
In Products Liability, the Ontario Law Reform Commission concurred
with the English Law Commission's refusal to exempt manufacturers of phar-
maceuticals from the principle of strict liability: "We know of no conclusive
evidence that establishes that the introduction of a principle of strict liability
will impede research and development in the pharmaceutical field. Even if
there were such evidence, and we are not convinced that research and devel-
opment should be at the expense of individual plaintiffs."'06
This reasoning is inapplicable in the immunization context. The security
of the supply of vaccine should be viewed as an incident to the public interest
in the control of communicable disease. The public interest in the availability
of vaccine should not be compromised by the wholesale application of strict
liability.16' 7
Even if it were conceded that the security of supply of vaccine might not
be jeopardized by application of strict liability, we are still left with the com-
pensation problem.16 Strict liability undoubtedly puts the plaintiff in a better
position than under negligence law. With strict liability, the causal link be-
tween the defect and the plaintiff's injury need not be proven, and the
defendant cannot rely on the defence of reasonableness. Nonetheless, respon-
sibility for pursuing compensation through the litigation process remains
squarely on the shoulders of the injured vaccinee.
163 42 U.S.C.A., §247b (i) (1).
164 Ohta, supra note 156, at 158.
165 Products Liability, supra note 13, at 69.
166 Id. at 90. While advocating the general application of strict liability to the field
of products liability, the Commission concedes strict liability may be inappropriate where
the public has an interest in a product's availability.
167 Id.
168 Ohta, supra note 156, at 159-160n. 82. Ohta's dramatic statistics on the concen-
tration of vaccine supply in the United States over the past 15 years make this a difficult
concession.
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B. Litigation as a Compensation Vehicle
It is not difficult to find support for the proposition that even with the
movement to strict liability in "warning of risk" cases, "the system remains
primarily a system for assigning fault, rather than for providing assistance to
victims of unavoidable accidents."''0 9 If vaccination injury victims do not
receive adequate warning of risk, then they face the daunting prospect of
seeking compensation through the courts. High legal costs, long delays and
the uncertainty of recovery act as powerful disincentives. Perhaps of more
importance is the situation where the victim has been adequately warned of
the inherent dangers of injury from a "no fault" adverse reaction. In that case
the victim bears full responsibility for the loss incurred as a consequence of
the injury. 1 0
Strict liability may ease the plaintiff's burden, but it certainly does not
remove it. It is inappropriate and unfair to require innocent victims, injured
in the course of serving the public interest in controlling communicable
disease, to seek compensation through the judicial process. That elaborate,
unwieldy mechanism, premised on an adversarial relationship between the
parties and directed at allocation of fault between them, is ill-equipped to
serve as a compensation vehicle.'
7 '
It must be recognized that the vaccinee's decision to submit to immuni-
zation is not simply another private decision by a patient to submit to medical
treatment. Society has an interest in and derives benefit from that decision.
Vaccination is a prophylactic measure; generally the vaccinee is in good
health before receiving the vaccine. Great gains have been made in the sup-
pression of communicable diseases over the past few decades and it is now
quite possible that a potential vaccinee faces a greater risk of having a serious
vaccine-induced adverse reaction than of contracting the disease through wild
virus in the community.1
7 2
Immunization is fundamentally a public health matter. Even when tem-
pered by the application of the strict liability doctrine, the fault allocation
oriented judicial process is a woefully inadequate compensation vehicle.
Responsibility, not fault, is at issue. The public's interest in and benefit from
the vaccinee's "private" decision to submit to immunization must be accom-
panied by public responsibility for the compensation of the victim. This is not
an argument for absolving vaccine manufacturers or administrators of re-
sponsibility for their negligence or fault. In the special context of immuniza-
tion, it is inequitable and irresponsible to force the injured vaccinee to pursue
109 D.H.E.W., supra note 12, at 39. Ladimer, Legal and Regulatory Perspectives in
Mass Immunization Programs, [1976] Ins. L. J. 459. Merrill, supra note 154, at 87.
170 D.H.E.W., supra note 12, at 39.
171 There is no shortage of critics of the litigation process-in particular, private
tort law-as a vehicle for the provision of compensation to accident victims. See, e.g.,
Glasbeek and Hasson, "Fault-the Great Hoax," in Klar, supra note 33, at 395-424;
Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursements
(1967), 53 Va. L. Rev. 774.
172 Merrill, supra note 154, at 100. Davis, supra note 119, at 129.
1980]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
the parties at fault through the courts. Any alternate approach to compensa-
tion could simply require vaccinees to subrogate their rights against potential
defendants to the body or authority providing the compensation. Whether
the victim subrogates to and receives fair compensation from that intervening
body, or pursues those legal rights directly and independently is a decision
that should be made by the vaccinee.
In the no-fault context, where injury is caused "not by a defective vac-
cine product or negligence on the part of the vaccinator, but by the inherent
properties of a particular vaccine, 17. the argument for public responsibility
for the compensation of the victim is even stronger. In arguing the case for
no-fault insurance, Krugman concedes that the lawsuit may be an adequate
compensation mechanism in situations involving malpractice, i.e. where fault
is present. 7 4 Krugman asserts, however, that:
in the majority of cases... there is no one at fault, and dyspractice, not malprac-
tice has occurred.
If society is to benefit from immunization practice, as it obviously does-witness
the dramatic decline in poliomyelitis, measles, diphtheria, and other diseases-then
society, through its government, should logically be responsible for immunization
dyspractice.175
C. Warnings: Informed Consent Versus Public Participation
in Immunization Programmes
The goals and priorities of public health authorities are not always in
perfect harmony with the goals and priorities of the private citizen.170 There
is almost always tension between the public's interest in the health of the
population at large and the individual's interest in making informed, inde-
pendent decisions.
17
A number of commentators178 have warned of a potentially very serious
side effect of strenuous efforts to provide adequate warnings by vaccine manu-
facturers, health professionals and immunization programme administrators.
Their concern is that the standard of detail set by the courts may lead to
over-emphasis of the dangers of vaccination, resulting in "unnecessary deter-
rence of public participation.' u7
The individual's right to receive information in sufficient detail and
clarity such that he is in a position to give an "informed consent" to medical
treatment is well recognized by both Canadian and American courts. 80 The
173 O.T.A., supra note 7, at 83.
174 Krugman, Immunization "Dyspractice": The Need for "No Fault" Insurance
(1975), 56 Pediatrics 159.
175 Id.
176 Rozovsky, supra note 32, at 1.
177 Franklin and Mais, Tort Law and Mass Immunization Programs: Lessons from
the Polio and Flu Episodes (1977), 65 Cal. L. Rev. 754 at 764-65.
178 E.g., Sharpe, supra note 56; Baynes, supra note 121 at 38; and D.H.E.W., supra
note 12, at 38.
179 D.H.E.W., id.
180 Kenny, supra note 38; Halushka, supra note 37; Male, supra note 38; Kelly,
supra note 43; and Reibl, supra note 54.
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decisions of the United States Court of Appeals in Davis, Reyes and Givens,
make it clear that in the United States potential vaccine recipients are en-
titled to adequate warning of a vaccine's inherent risk, even in the mass im-
munization and public health clinic contexts. In Reyes, the Court ruled that
"[a] drug manufacturer is held to the skill of an expert in his field, and is
presumed to possess an expert's knowledge of the arts, materials and pro-
cesses of the pharmaceutical business.' 81
The general doctrine of informed consent is well established in Canada,
but the law is unclear regarding the degree of detail required in the im-
munization context. Rozovsky suggests:
the patient should be told as much as possible about the risks without the necessity
of informing him of the extremely rare risks-unless he asks in which case he must
be informed of them. At the commencement of any preventative immunization
programme, a list of all risks should be compiled and a decision made as to how
and if the patients are to be informed of them. 182
The interaction of the societal interest in large scale public participation
in immunization programmes and the private and legal interests in informed
consent yields contradiction and tension. This is inevitable, given the mis-
conception implicit in the current approach to compensating victims of im-
munization injury that the vaccinee's decision to be immunized is essentially
a private matter.
The absurdity of treating the decision to submit to immunization and the
burden of seeking compensation for resultant injury as the private responsi-
bilities of the vaccinee is particularly evident in the context of mandatory
immunization programmes.
Although compulsory immunization legislation is extremely limited in
Canada,183 such schemes have become commonplace in the United States. By
September 1973, forty-one American states had implemented legislation mak-
ing immunization mandatory for school admission. 184 Such legislation renders
the protection afforded by warnings of risks inherent in the use of vaccines
illusory. Since school attendance is required by law, parents must subject
their children to immunization or risk criminal prosecution for failing to send
their children to school.1
8 ,
181 Reyes, supra note 123, at 1277. See Mann, supra note 115, at 255.
182 Report, supra note 32, at 19. In Rozovsky's view, "[tihere is no clear answer to
this dilemma except to say that the patient should be told as much as possible about the
risks without the necessity of informing him of the extremely rare cases-unless he asks
in which case he must be informed of them."
183 Id. at 35-37. But note Manitoba's Public Health Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. P-2 10, s.
34(10).
184 Geeson and Sowell, A School Immunization Law is Successful in Terms (1975),
90 Public Health Reports 21 at 21.
185 Baynes, supra note 160, at 62:
In mandatory immunization programmes, a warning becomes a fiction. There is no
choice on the part of the patient, or other persons receiving the vaccine. The
court in Reyes suggests that one would have a choice to be innoculated with
killed virus Salk vaccine, whether to provide complete immunity or as a pre-
cautionary prelude to ingesting oral vaccine. The problem is there are not always
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While the fallacy and invalidity of the "immunization is a private mat-
ter" argument is perhaps most visible in the mandatory immunization context,
one need not go that far to reject the proposition. In Canada, the United
States and most other developed nations, the state takes an active role in the
establishment of immunization programmes. Local health authorities and
various levels of government vigorously solicit public participation in those
programmes. School systems are widely used as vehicles for immunization
programmes.'
8 6
In short, immunization is a public matter. Large scale public participa-
tion is essential to the success of immunization programmes, and the public
at large is the primary beneficiary of those programmes. The public interest
in and benefit from the individual's decision to submit to immunization
should be matched by a concomitant public commitment to ensure that vac-
cine related injury is fairly and expeditiously compensated.
V. CONCLUSION: ALTERNATIVES
The purpose of this article has been to demonstrate the inadequacy of
current Canadian law as a vehicle for the compensation of victims of im-
munization injury-particularly where injury occurs as a result of risk in-
herent in a vaccine that meets applicable standards. It has been argued that
private tort law, which is fault-oriented and rooted in the adversarial litigation
process, is a fundamentally inappropriate approach to this public health issue.
Recent American cases, imposing strict liability and a formidable duty
to warn on vaccine manufacturers were assessed. It was argued that the
approach indicated by the Davis, Reyes and Givens cases fails to address the
compensation problem, and may pose a serious threat to security of vaccine
supply and to public participation in immunization programmes. It seems
inevitable that this American trend, like so many others that have preceded
it, will spill over into Canada unless deliberate, prompt action is taken to
avert it.
It is hoped that the need to consider alternative compensation mecha-
nisms has been established. The list of options is wide-ranging, and must
include: major modifications of tort law,187 a publicly administered and
funded compensation system,188 government indemnification of vaccine man-
alternatives such [sic] in the case of measles, or small pox vaccine. Further Salk
vaccine is possibly no longer available and if it was, do we warn about the pos-
sibilities of another Gottsdanker incident, and even if not, any warning would
still provide no protective function where the patient must take the vaccine.
186 In early 1979, the Ontario Ministry of Health proposed that all school children
should be immunized unless their parents specifically refuse to grant permission. At that
time Dennis Timbrell, the Minister of Health, stressed the proposal was "just at the dis-
cussion stage." The suggestion has been regarded by public health officials in other juris-
dictions as a first step toward compulsory immunization. Ontario Proposal Seen as a
Step Toward Compulsory Immunization (1979), 25 Can. Fam. Physician 262, at 262.
187 D.H.E.W., supra note 120, at 73.
188 Natl Immunization Work Groups, Report and Recommendations on Liability
(Washington: Office of Ass't Sec'y for Health, 1979).
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ufacturers' and other participants' losses arising from participation in im-
munization programmes,189 government sponsored reinsurance backing to
primary insurers for vaccine-related risks' 90 and "no-fault" insurance.'""
Legislative schemes premised on the recognition that immunization is
fundamentally a public matter, and that the compensation of victims of im-
munization injury should be a public responsibility, have been in place in
several European countries for a number of years.19 2 In 1979 Britain enacted
the Vaccine Damage Payments Act,193 enabling the Secretary of State to
"make a flat payment of £10,000 [not any portion of it] to the benefit of
the injured person or to his personal representatives if the Secretary of State
is satisfied that the person is, or was immediately before his death, severely
disabled as a result of vaccination against any of the diseases to which the
Act applies." 94 This new British legislation is not without its difficulties, or
its critics, 195 but it is a vast improvement over the common law approach to
compensation.
In recent years public health authorities in a number of provinces have
responded to serious cases of immunization-related injury with the ad hoc
provision of assistance and compensation. 196 This responsible conduct is
laudable, but not enough. More than the discretionary, informal and un-
official availability of government largesse is required; a coherent, visible
approach to compensating victims of immunization injury must be developed.
There are encouraging signs that some Canadian public health adminis-
trators and policy makers are growing dissatisfied with the prevailing law and
practice of compensation. 197 It is to be hoped that dissatisfaction proves to be
highly contagious.
189 Curran and Pies, Vaccines and Liability: Final Report (Washington: D.H.E.W.,
1975). See also D.H.E.W., supra note 12, at 87.
190 Id.
191 Krugman, supra note 174; and D.H.E.W., supra note 12, at 87.
192 Curran, supra note 117, at 7-9; Curran and Pies, supra note 189, at 9; and Report,
supra note 32, at 25-27.
193 1979, c. 17 (U.K.).
194 Report, supra note 32, at 25.
195 Dworkin, Compensation and Payments for Vaccine Damage, [1978-79] J. Soc.
Welfare L. 331.
196 Discussions with Frank White and Richard Mathias, epidemiologists for the prov-
ince of British Columbia (July 2, 1980). Details of specific cases were withheld out of
understandable reluctance to prejudice pending and possible legal actions.
197 British Columbia and Alberta are currently considering major amendments to
their public health legislation; public health legislation planners in both provinces are
wrestling with the immunization injury compensation problem.
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